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Abstract
Significant success has been realized recently on
applying machine learning to real-world applica-
tions. There have also been corresponding con-
cerns on the privacy of training data, which re-
lates to data security and confidentiality issues.
Differential privacy provides a principled and
rigorous privacy guarantee on machine learning
models. While it is common to design a model
satisfying a required differential-privacy prop-
erty by injecting noise, it is generally hard to
balance the trade-off between privacy and util-
ity. We show that stochastic gradient Markov
chain Monte Carlo (SG-MCMC) – a class of
scalable Bayesian posterior sampling algorithms
proposed recently – satisfies strong differential
privacy with carefully chosen step sizes. We de-
velop theory on the performance of the proposed
differentially-private SG-MCMC method. We
conduct experiments to support our analysis, and
show that a standard SG-MCMC sampler with-
out any modification (under a default setting)
can reach state-of-the-art performance in terms
of both privacy and utility on Bayesian learning.
1 Introduction
Utilizing large amounts of data has helped machine learn-
ing algorithms achieve significant success in many real ap-
plications. However, such work also raises privacy con-
cerns. For example, a diagnostic system based on machine
learning algorithms may be trained on a large quantity of
patient data, such as medical images. It is important to pro-
tect training data from adversarial attackers [Shokri et al.,
2017]. However, even themost widely-usedmachine learn-
ing algorithms such as deep learning could implicitly mem-
orize the training data [Papernot et al., 2016], meaning that
the learned model parameters implicitly contain informa-
tion that could violate the privacy of training data. Such
algorithms may be readily attacked.
The above potential model vulnerability can be addressed
by differential privacy (DP), a general notion of algorithm
privacy [Dwork, 2008, Dwork et al., 2006]. It is designed
to provide a strong privacy guarantee for general learning
procedures, such as statistical analysis and machine learn-
ing algorithms, that involve private information.
Among the popular machine learning algorithms, Bayesian
inference has realized significant success recently, due
to its capacity to leverage expert knowledge and em-
ploy uncertainty estimates. Notably, the recently devel-
oped stochastic gradient Markov chain Monte Carlo (SG-
MCMC) technique enables scalable Bayesian inference in
a big-data setting. While there have been many exten-
sions of SG-MCMC, little work has been directed at study-
ing the privacy properties of such algorithms. Specifically,
Wang et al. [2015] showed that an SG-MCMC algorithm
with appropriately chosen step sizes preserves differential
privacy. In practice, however, their analysis requires the
step size to be extremely small to limit the risk of violat-
ing privacy. Such a small step size is not practically useful
for training models with non-convex posterior distribution
landscapes, which is the most common case in recent ma-
chine learning models. More details of this issue are dis-
cussed in Section 3.1.
On the other hand, Abadi et al. [2016] introduced a new
privacy-accounting method, which allows one to keep
better track of the privacy loss (defined in Section 2.1)
for sequential algorithms. Further, they proposed a
differentially-private stochastic gradient descending (DP-
SGD) method for training machine learning models pri-
vately. Although they showed a significant improvement in
calculating the privacy loss, there is no theory showing that
their DP-SGD has a guaranteed performance under privacy
constraints.
In this paper, built on the notation of the privacy account-
ing method, we show that using SG-MCMC for training
large-scale machine learning models is sufficient to achieve
strong differential privacy. Specifically, we combine the
advantages of the aforementioned works, and prove that
SG-MCMC methods naturally satisfy the definition of dif-
ferential privacy even without changing their default step
size, thus allowing both good utility and strong privacy in
practice.
2 Preliminaries
The following notation is used through out the paper. An
input database containing N data points is represented as
X = (d1, . . . ,dN ) ∈ XN , where di ∈ X . The parameters
of interest in the model are denoted θ ∈ Rr, e.g., these
may be the weights of a deep neural network. The identity
matrix is denoted I.
2.1 Differential Privacy
The concept of differential privacy was proposed by Dwork
[2008] to describe the privacy modeling property of a ran-
domized mechanism (algorithm) on two adjacent datasets.
Definition 1 (Adjacent Datasets) Two datasetsX andX ′
are called adjacent if they only differ by one record, e.g.,
di 6= d′i for some i, where di ∈ X and d′i ∈ X ′.
Definition 2 (Differential Privacy) Given a pair of adja-
cent datasets X and X ′, a randomized mechanism M :
XN → Y mapping from data space to its range Y sat-
isfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy if for all measurable S ⊂
range(M) and all adjacentX andX ′
Pr(M(X) ∈ S) ≤ eǫPr(M(X ′) ∈ S) + δ
where Pr(e) denotes the probability of event e, and ǫ and
δ are two positive real numbers that indicate the loss of
privacy. When δ = 0, we say the mechanism M has ǫ-
differential privacy.
Differential privacy places constraints on the difference be-
tween the outputs of two adjacent inputs X and X ′ by a
random mechanism. If we assume that X andX ′ only dif-
fer by one record di, by observing the outputs, any out-
side attackers are not able to recognize whether the out-
put has resulted from X and X ′, as long as ǫ and δ are
small enough (making these two probabilities close to each
other). Thus, the existence of the record di is protected.
Since the record in which the two datasets differ by is arbi-
trary, the privacy protection is applicable for all records.
To better describe the randomness of the outputs ofMwith
inputs X and X ′, we define a random variable called pri-
vacy loss.
Definition 3 (Privacy Loss) LetM : XN → Y be a ran-
domized mechanism, andX and X ′ are a pair of adjacent
datasets. Let aux denote any auxiliary input that does not
depend onX orX ′. For an outcome o ∈ Y from the mech-
anismM, the privacy loss at o is defined as:
c(o;M, aux, X,X ′) ∆= log Pr[M(aux, X) = o]
Pr[M(aux, X ′) = o]
It can be shown that the (ǫ, δ)-DP is equivalent to the tail
bound of the distribution of its corresponding privacy loss
random variable [Abadi et al., 2016] (see Theorem 1 in the
next section), thus this random variable is an important tool
for quantifying the privacy loss of a mechanism.
2.2 Moments Accountant Method
A common approach for achieving differential privacy is to
introduce random noise, to hide the existence of a particu-
lar data point. For example, Laplace and Gaussian mecha-
nisms [Dwork et al., 2014] add i.i.d.Laplace random noise
and Gaussian noise, respectively, to an algorithm. While a
large amount of noise makes an algorithm differentially pri-
vate, it may sacrifice the utility of the algorithm. Therefore,
in such paradigms, it is important to calculate the smallest
amount of noise that is required to achieve a certain level
of differential privacy.
The moments accountant method proposed in Abadi et al.
[2016] keeps track of a bound of the moments of the pri-
vacy loss random variables defined above. As a result, it
allows one to calculate the amount of noise needed to en-
sure the privacy loss under a given threshold.
Definition 4 (Moments Accountant) LetM : XN → Y
be a randomized mechanism, and letX andX ′ be a pair of
adjacent data sets. Let aux denote any auxiliary input that
is independent of bothX andX ′. The moments accountant
with an integer parameter λ is defined as:
αM(λ)
∆
= max
aux,d,d′
αM(λ; aux, X,X
′)
where αM(λ; aux, X,X
′) ,
logE[exp(λc(M, aux, X,X ′))] is the log of the mo-
ment generating function evaluated at λ, that is the λth
moment of the privacy loss random variable.
The following moments bound on Gaussian mechanism
with random sampling is proved in [Abadi et al., 2016].
Theorem 1 [Composability] Suppose that M consists of
a sequence of adaptive mechanisms M1, . . . ,Mk where
Mi :
∏i−1
j=1 Yj × X → Yi, and Yi is the range of the ith
mechanism, i.e.,M =Mk ◦ · · · ◦M1, with ◦ the compo-
sition operator. Then, for any λ
αM(λ) =
k∑
i=1
αMi(λ)
where the auxiliary input for αMi is defined as all αMj ’s
outputs, {oj}, for j < i; and αM takesM′is output, {oi}
for i < k, as the auxiliary input.
[Tail bound] For any ǫ > 0, the mechanismM is (ǫ, δ)-DP
for
δ = min
λ
exp (αM(λ) − λǫ)
For the rest of this paper, for simplicity we only consider
mechanisms that output a real-valued vector. That is,M :
XN → Rp.
Using the properties above, the following lemma about
the moments accountant has been proven in [Abadi et al.,
2016]:
Lemma 2 Suppose that f : D → Rp with ‖f(.)‖ ≤ 1.
Let σ ≥ 1 and J is a mini-batch sample with sampling
probability q, i.e., q = τN with minibatch size of τ . If q <
1
16σ , for any positive integer λ ≤ σ2 ln 1qσ , the mechanism
M(X) =∑i∈J f(di) +N(0, σ2I) satisfies
αM(λ) ≤ q
2λ(λ + 1)
(1− q)σ2 +O(q
3λ3/σ3)
In the following, we build our analysis of the differentially-
private SG-MCMC based on this lemma.
2.3 Stochastic Gradient Markov Chain Monte Carlo
SG-MCMC is a family of scalable Bayesian sampling al-
gorithms, developed recently to generate approximate sam-
ples from a posterior distribution p(θ|X), with θ a model
parameter vector. SG-MCMC mitigates the slow mix-
ing and non-scalability issues encountered by traditional
MCMC algorithms, by i) adopting gradient information of
the posterior distribution, and ii) using minibatches of data
in each iteration of the algorithm. It is particularly suitable
for large-scale Bayesian learning, and thus is becoming in-
creasingly popular.
SG-MCMC algorithms are discretized numerical approx-
imations of continuous-time Itoˆ diffusions [Chen et al.,
2015, Ma et al., 2015], whose stationary distributions are
designed to coincide with p(θ|X). Formally, an Itoˆ diffu-
sion is written as
dΘt = F (Θt)dt+ g(Θt)dWt , (1)
with t is the time index; Θt ∈ Rp represents the full vari-
ables in a system, where typically Θt ⊇ θt (thus p ≥ r) is
an augmentation of the model parameters; andWt ∈ Rp is
p-dimensional Brownian motion. Functions F : Rp → Rp
and g : Rp → Rp×p are assumed to satisfy the Lipschitz
continuity condition [Ghosh, 2011].
Based on the Itoˆ diffusion, SG-MCMC algorithms fur-
ther develop three components for scalable inference: i)
define appropriate functions F and g in (1) so that their
(marginal) stationary distributions coincide with the target
posterior distribution p(θ|X); ii) replace F or g with unbi-
ased stochastic approximations to reduce the computational
complexity, e.g., approximating F with a random subset of
data points instead of using the full data; and iii) solve the
generally intractable continuous-time Itoˆ diffusions with a
numerical method, which typically brings estimation errors
that are controllable.
The stochastic gradient Langevin dynamic (SGLD) model
defines Θ = θ, and F (Θt) = −∇θU(θ), g(Θt) =√
2 Ir, where U(θ) , − log p(θ)−
∑N
i=1 log p(di |θ) de-
notes the unnormalized negative log-posterior, and p(θ) is
the prior distribution of θ. The stochastic gradient Hamilto-
nian Monte Carlo (SGHMC) method [Chen et al., 2014] is
based on second-order Langevin dynamics, which defines
Θ = (θ,q), and
F (Θt) =
(
q
−B q−∇θU(θ)
)
, g(Θt) =
√
2B
(
0 0
0 In
)
for a scalar B > 0; q is an auxiliary variable known as the
momentum [Chen et al., 2014, Ding et al., 2014]. Similar
formulae can be defined for other SG-MCMC algorithms,
such as the stochastic gradient thermostat [Ding et al.,
2014], and other variants with Riemannian information ge-
ometry [Patterson and Teh, 2013, Ma et al., 2015, Li et al.,
2016].
To make the algorithms scalable in a large-data setting,
i.e., when N is large, an unbiased version of ∇θU(θ) is
calculated with a random subset of the full data, denoted
∇θU˜(θ) and defined as
∇θU˜(θ) = ∇ log p(θ) + N
τ
∑
di∈J
log p(di |θ) ,
where J is a randomminibatch of the data with size τ (typ-
ically τ ≪ N ).
We typically adopt the popular Euler method to solve the
continuous-time diffusion by an η-time discretization (step
size being η). The Euler method is a first-order numeri-
cal integrator, thus inducing an O(η) approximation error
[Chen et al., 2015]. Algorithm 1 illustrates the application
of SGLD algorithmwith the Euler integrator for differential
privacy, which is almost the same as original SGLD except
that there is a gradient norm clipping in Step 4 of the algo-
rithm. The norm-clipping step ensures that the computed
gradients satisfy the Lipschitz condition, a common as-
sumption on loss functions in a differential-privacy setting
[Song et al., 2013, Bassily et al., 2014, Wang et al., 2015].
The reasoning is intuitively clear: since differential privacy
requires the output to be non-sensitive to any changes on an
arbitrary data point, it is thus crucial to bound the impact
of a single data point to the target function. The Lipschitz
condition is easily met by clipping the norm of a loss func-
tion, a common technique for gradient-based algorithms to
prevent gradient explosion [Pascanu et al., 2013].
The clipping is equivalent to using an adaptive step size as
in preconditioned SGLD [Li et al., 2016], and thus it does
not impact its convergence rate in terms of the estimation
accuracy discussed in Section 3.2.
Algorithm 1 Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics with
Differential Privacy
Require: Data X of size N , size of mini-batch τ , num-
ber of iterations T , prior p(θ), privacy parameter ǫ, δ,
gradient norm bound L. A decreasing/fixed-step-size
sequence {ηt}. Set t = 1.
1: for t ∈ [T ] do
2: Take a random sample Jt with sampling probability
q = τ/N .
3: Calculate gt(di)← ∇ log ℓ(θt|di)
4: Clip norm: g˜t(di)← gt(di)/max
(
1, ‖gt(di)‖2L
)
5: Sample each coordinate of zt iid fromN(0,
ηt
N I)
6: Update θt+1 ← θt −
ηt
(
∇ log p(θ)
N +
1
τ
∑
i∈Jt
g˜t(di)
)
+ zt
7: Return θt+1 as a posterior sample (after a predefined
burn-in period).
8: Increment t← t+ 1.
9: end for
10: θT and compute the overall privacy cost (ǫ, δ) using a
the moment accountant method.
3 Privacy Analysis for Stochastic Gradient
Langevin Dynamics
We first develop theory to prove Algorithm 1 is (ǫ, δ)-DP
under a certain condition. Our theory shows a significant
improvement of the differential privacy obtained by SGLD
over the most related work by Wang et al. [2015]. To study
the estimation accuracy (utility) of the algorithm, the cor-
responding mean square error estimation bounds are then
proved under such differential-privacy settings.
3.1 Step size bounds for differentially-private SGLD
Previous work on SG-MCMC has shown that an appropri-
ately chosen decreasing step size sequence can be adopted
for an SG-MCMC algorithm [Teh et al., 2016, Chen et al.,
2015]. For the sequence in the form of ηt = O(t
−α), the
optimal value is α = 13 in order to obtain the optimal mean
square error bound (defined in Section 3.2). Consequently,
we first consider ηt = O(t
−1/3) in our analysis below,
where the constant of the stepsize can be specified with
parameters of the DP setting, shown in Theorem 3. The
differential privacy property under a fixed step size is also
discussed subsequently.
Theorem 3 If we let the step size decrease at the rate of
O(t−1/3), there exist positive constants c1 and c2 such that
given the sampling probability q = τ/N and the number
of iterations T , for any ǫ < c1q
2T 2/3, Algorithm 1 satisfies
(ǫ, δ)-DP as long as ηt satisfies:
1. ηt ≤ NL2
2. ηt >
q2N
256L2
3. ηt <
ǫ2Nt−1/3
c2
2
L2T 2/3 log(1/δ)
.
Proof See Section A of the SM.
Remark 1 In practice, the first condition is easy to satisfy
as NL2 is often much larger than the step size. The second
condition is also easy to satisfy with properly chosen L and
q, and we will verify this condition in our experiments. In
the rest of this section, we only focus on the third condition
as an upper bound to the step size.
It is now clear that with the optimal decreasing step size
sequence (in terms of MSE defined in Section 3.2), Algo-
rithm 1 maintains (ǫ, δ)-DP. There are other variants of SG-
MCMC which use fixed step sizes. We show in Theorem 4
that in this case, the algorithm still satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP.
Theorem 4 Under the same setting as Theorem 3, but us-
ing a fixed-step size ηt = η, Algorithm 1 satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP
whenever η < ǫ
2N
c2L2Tlog(1/δ) for another constant c.
Proof See Section D of the SM.
In [Wang et al., 2015], the authors proved that the SGLD
method is (ǫ, δ)-DP if the step size ηt is small enough to
satisfy
ηt <
ǫ2N
128L2T log
(
2.5T
δ
)
log(2/δ)
.
This bound is relatively small compared to ours (explained
below), thus it is not practical in real applications. To ad-
dress this problem,Wang et al. [2015] proposed the Hybrid
Posterior Sampling algorithm, that uses the One Posterior
Sample (OPS) estimator for the “burn-in” period, followed
by the SGLD with a small step size to guarantee the dif-
ferential privacy property. We note that for complicated
models, especially with non-convex target posterior land-
scapes, such an upper bound for step size still brings prac-
tical problems even with the OPS. One issue is that the
Markov chain will mix very slowly with a small step size,
leading to highly correlated samples.
By contrast, our new upper bound for the step size in The-
orem 3, ηt <
ǫ2Nt−1/3
c2
2
L2T 2/3 log(1/δ)
, improves the bound in
Wang et al. [2015] by a factor of T 1/3 log(T/δ) at the first
iteration. Note the constant c22 in our bound is empirically
smaller than 128 (see the calculating method in Section C
of the SM), thus still giving a larger bound overall.
To provide intuition on how our bound compares with that
in Wang et al. [2015], consider the MNIST data set with
N = 50, 000. If we set ǫ = 0.1, δ = 10−5, T = 10000,
and L = 1, our upper bound can be calculated as ηt <
0.103, consistent with the default step size when training
MNIST [Li et al., 2016]. More importantly, our theory in-
dicates that using SGLD with the default step size ηt = 0.1
is able to achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP with a small privacy loss for
the MNIST dataset. As a comparison, [Wang et al., 2015]
gives a much smaller upper bound of ηt < 1.54 × 10−6,
which is too small too be practically used. More detailed
comparison for these two bounds is given in Section 4.1,
when considering experimental results.
Finally, note that as in [Wang et al., 2015], our analysis
can be easily extended to other SG-MCMC methods such
as SGHMC [Chen et al., 2014] and SGNHT [Ding et al.,
2014]. We do not specify the results here for conciseness.
3.2 Utility Bounds
The above theory indicates that, with a smaller step size,
one can manifest an SG-MCMC algorithm that preserves
more privacy, e.g., (0, δ)-DP in the limit of zero step size.
On the other hand, when the step size approaches zero,
we get (theoretically) exact samples from the posterior dis-
tributions. In this case, the implication of privacy be-
comes transparent because changing one data point typi-
cally would not impact prediction under a posterior distri-
bution in a Bayesian model. However, as we note above,
this does not mean we can choose arbitrarily small step
sizes, because this would hinder the exploration of the pa-
rameter space, leading to slow mixing.
To measure the mixing and utility property, we inves-
tigate the estimation accuracy bounds under the differ-
ential privacy setting. Following standard settings for
SG-MCMC [Chen et al., 2015, Vollmer et al., 2016], we
use the mean square error (MSE) under a target poste-
rior distribution to measure the estimation accuracy for a
Bayesian model. Specifically, our utility goal is to eval-
uate the posterior average of a test function φ(θ), de-
fined as φ¯ ,
∫
φ(θ)p(θ|D)dθ, with a posterior distribu-
tion p(θ|D). The posterior average is typically infeasi-
ble to compute, thus we use the sample average, φˆL ,
1∑
t ηt
∑T
t=1 ηtφ(θt), to approximate φ¯, where {θt}Tt=1 are
the samples from an SG-MCMC algorithm. The MSE we
desire is defined as E
(
φˆT − φ¯
)2
.
Our result is summarized in Proposition 5, an extension
of Theorem 3 in [Chen et al., 2017] for the differentially-
privacy SG-MCMC with decreasing step sizes. In this
section we impose the same assumptions on an SG-
MCMC algorithm as in previous work [Vollmer et al.,
2016, Chen et al., 2015], which are detailed in Section B
of the SM. We assume both the corresponding Itoˆ diffusion
(in terms of its coefficients) and the numerical method of
an SG-MCMC algorithm to be well behaved.
Proposition 5 Under Assumption 1 in the SM, the MSE
of SGLD with a decreasing step size sequence {ηt <
ǫ2Nt−1/3
c2
2
L2T 2/3 log(1/δ)
} as in Theorem 3 is bounded, for a con-
stant C independent of {η, T, τ} and a constant ΓM de-
pending on T and U(·), as E
(
φˆL − φ¯
)2
≤ C
(
2
3
(
N
n
− 1
)
N2ΓMT
−1 +
1
3η˜0
+ 2η˜20T
−2/3
)
.
where η˜0 ,
ǫ2
c2
2
L2 log(1/δ)
.
The bound in Proposition 5 indicates how the MSE de-
creases to zero w.r.t. the number of iterations T and other
parameters. It is consistent with standard SG-MCMC, lead-
ing to a similar convergence rate. Interestingly, we can also
derive the optimal bounds w.r.t. the privacy parameters. For
example, the optimal value for η˜0 when fixing other pa-
rameters can be seen as η˜0 = O
(
T 2/9
)
. Consequently,
we have ǫ2 = O
(
L2T 2/9 log(1/δ)
)
in the optimal MSE
setting. Different from the bound of standard SG-MCMC
Chen et al. [2015], when considering a (ǫ, δ)-DP setting,
the MSE bound induces an asymptotic bias term of 13η˜0 as
long as ǫ and δ are not equal to zero.
We also wish to study the MSE under the fixed-step-size
case. Consider a general situation, i.e., ηt = η, for which
Chen et al. [2017] has proved the followingMSE bound for
a fixed steps size, rephrased in Lemma 6.
Lemma 6 With the same Assumption as Proposition 5, the
MSE of SGLD is bounded as∗:
E
(
φˆL − φ¯
)2
≤ C
(
(Nτ − 1)N2ΓM
T
+
1
Tη
+ η2
)
.
Furthermore, the optimal MSE w.r.t. the step size η is
bounded by
E
(
φˆL − φ¯
)2
≤ C
(
(Nτ − 1)N2ΓM
T
+ T−2/3
)
,
with the optimal step size being η = O(T−1/3).
From Lemma 6, the optimal step size, i.e., η = O(T−1/3),
is of a lower order than both our differential-privacy-
based algorithm (η = O(T−1)) and the algorithm in
Wang et al. [2015], i.e., η = O(T−1 log−1 T ). This
means that for T large enough, both ours and the method
∗With a slight abuse of notation, the constant C is independent
of {η, T, τ}, but might be different from that in Proposition 5.
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Figure 1: Upper bounds for fixed-step size and decreasing-
step size with different privacy loss ǫ, as well as the upper
bound from Wang et al. [2015].
in Wang et al. [2015] might not run on the optimal step
size setting. A remedy for this is to increase the step
size at the cost of increasing privacy loss. Because for
the same privacy loss, our step sizes are typically larger
than in Wang et al. [2015], our algorithm is able to obtain
both higher approximate accuracy and differential privacy.
Specifically, to guarantee the desired differential-privacy
property as stated in Theorem 4, we substitute a step size
of η = ǫ
2N
c2L2Tlog(1/δ) into the MSE formula in Lemma 6.
Consequently, the MSE is bounded by E
(
φˆL − φ¯
)2
≤
C
(
(Nτ −1)N
2ΓM
T +
c2
2
L2 log 1δ
ǫ2N +
ǫ4N2
c4
2
L4T 2 log2(1/δ)
)
, which
is smaller than for the method in Wang et al. [2015].
4 Experiments
We test the proposed differentially-private SG-MCMC al-
gorithms by considering several tasks, including logistic
regression and deep neural networks, and compare with re-
lated Bayesian and optimization methods in terms of both
algorithm privacy and utility.
4.1 Upper Bound
We first compare our upper bound for the step size in Sec-
tion 3.1 with the bound of Wang et al. [2015]. Note this
upper bound denotes the largest step size allowed to pre-
serve (ǫ, δ)-DP.
In this simulation experiment, we use the following setting:
N = 50, 000, T = 10, 000,L = 1, and δ = 10−5. We vary
ǫ from 0.02 to 1.7 for different differential-privacy settings,
for both ours (fixed and decreasing-step size cases) and the
bound in Wang et al. [2015], with results in Figure 1. It is
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Figure 2: Step size upper bounds for N =
103, 104, 105, 106 with fixed L = 1 (top), and
L = 0.1, 0.5, 1.0, 10.0 with fixed N = 104 (bottom). In
both simulations, we let δ = 1/N and T = N .
clear that our bounds give much larger step sizes than from
Wang et al. [2015] at a same privacy loss, e.g., 10−1 vs.
10−4. Our step sizes appear to be much more practical in
real applications.
In the rest of our experiments, we focus on using the
decreasing-step size SGLD as it gives a nicer MSE bound
as shown in Proposition 5. For the parameters in our
bounds, i.e., (N, T, ǫ, δ, L), the default setting is often cho-
sen to be δ = O(1/N) and T = O(N); L is typically se-
lected from a range such as L ∈ {0.1, 1, 10}. In this exper-
iment, we investigate the sensitivity of our proposed upper
bound w.r.t. N and L when fixing other parameters. The
results are plotted in Figure 2, from which we observe that
our proposed step size bound is stable in terms of the data
size N , and is approximately proportional to 1/L. Such a
conclusion is not a direct implication from the upper bound
formula in Theorem 3, as the constant c2 also depends on
(N, T, ǫ, δ, L).
The result also indicates a rule for choosing step sizes in
practice by using our upper bound, which fall into the range
of (10−4, 0.1). When using such step sizes, we observe that
the standard SGLD automatically preserves (ǫ, δ)-DP even
when ǫ is small.
4.2 Logistic Regression
In the remaining experiments, we compare our proposed
differentially-private SGLD (DP-SGLD) with other meth-
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Figure 3: Test accuracies on a classification task based
on Bayesian logistic regression for One-Posterior Sample
(OPS), Hybrid Posterior sampling based on SGLD, and our
proposed DP-SGLD with different choice of privacy loss ǫ.
The non-private baseline is obtained by standard SGLD.
ods. The Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles
(PATE) model proposed in Papernot et al. [2016] is the
state-of-the-art framework for differentially private train-
ing of machine learning models. PATE takes advan-
tage of the moment accountant method for privacy loss
calculation, and uses a knowledge-transfer technique via
semi-supervised learning, to build a teacher-student-based
model. This framework first trains multiple teachers with
private data; these teachers then differentially and privately
release aggregated knowledge, such as label assignments
on several public data points, to multiple students. The stu-
dents then use the released knowledge to train their mod-
els in a supervised learning setting, or they can incorpo-
rate unlabeled data in a semi-supervised learning setting.
The semi-supervised setting generally works for many ma-
chine learning models, yet it requires a large amount of
non-private unlabeled data for training, which are not al-
ways available in practice. Thus, we did not consider this
setting in our experiments.
We compare DP-SGLD with PATE and the Hybrid Pos-
terior Sampling algorithm on the Adult data set from the
UCI Machine Learning Repository [Lichman, 2013], for a
binary classification task with Bayesian logistic regression,
under the DP setting. We fix δ = 10−4, and compare the
classification accuracy while varying ǫ. We repeat each ex-
periment ten times, and report averages and the standard
deviations, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Our proposed DP-SGLD achieves a higher accuracy com-
pared to other methods and is close to the baseline where
the plain SGLD is used. In fact, when ǫ ≈ 0.3 or above, our
DP-SGLD becomes the standard SGLD, therefore has the
same test accuracy as the baseline. Note that PATE obtains
the worst performance in this experiment. This might be
because when ǫ is small and without unlabeled data, the
students in this framework are restricted to using super-
vised learning with an extremely small amount of training
data.
4.3 Deep Neural Networks
We test our methods for training deep neural networks un-
der differentially-private settings. We compare our meth-
ods with PATE and the DP-SGD proposed in Abadi et al.
[2016]. Since the performance of PATE highly depends on
the availability of public unlabeled data, we allow it to ac-
cess a certain amount of unlabeled data, though it is not
a fair comparison to our method. We do not include the
results with Hybrid Posterior sampling, as it does not con-
verge due to its small step sizes in the experiments.
We use two datasets: (i) the standard MNIST dataset for
handwritten digit recognition, consisting of 60,000 training
examples and 10,000 testing examples [LeCun and Cortes,
2010]; and (ii) the Street View House Number (SVHN)
dataset, which contains 600,000 32 × 32 RGB images of
printed digits obtained from pictures of house number in
street view [Netzer et al.]. We use the same network struc-
ture as for the PATE model, which contains two stacked
convolutional layers and one fully connected layer with
ReLUs for MNIST, and two more convolutional layers for
SVHN. We use standard Gaussian priors for the weights of
the DNN. For the MNIST dataset, the standard SGLD with
step size ηt = 0.1t
−1/3 satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP for ǫ = 0.10 and
δ = 10−5 when we set L = 4. For the SVHN dataset, the
standard SGLD with step size ηt = 0.1t
1/3 satisfies (ǫ, δ)-
DP for ǫ = 0.12 and δ = 10−6 when we set L = 1. In both
settings, we let q = 1/
√
N to satisfy the second condi-
tion in Theorem 3. In addition, we also ran a differentially-
private version of the SGHMC for comparison. The test ac-
curacies are shown in Table 4.3. It is shown that SGLD and
SGHMC obtain better test accuracy than the state-of-the-
art differential privacymethods, remarkably with much less
privacy loss. They even outperformed the non-private base-
line model using Adam, due to the advantages of Bayesian
modeling.
5 Related Work
There have been several papers that have considered
differentially-private stochastic gradient based methods.
For example, Song et al. [2013] proposed a differentially-
private stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm, which
requires a large amount of noise when mini-batches are
randomly sampled. The theoretical performance of noisy
SGD is studied in Bassily et al. [2014] for the special case
of convex loss functions. Therefore, for a non-convex loss
function, a common setting for many machine learning
Table 1: Test accuracies on MNIST and and SVHN for
different methods.
Dataset Methods ǫ δ Accuracy
Non-Private 99.23%
PATE(100) 2.04 10−5 98.00%
MNIST PATE(1000) 8.03 10−5 98.10%
DP-SGLD 0.10 10−5 99.12%
DP-SGHMC 0.24 10−5 99.28%
Non-Private 92.80%
PATE(100) 5.04 10−6 82.76%
SVHN PATE(1000) 8.19 10−6 90.66%
DP-SGLD 0.12 10−6 92.14%
DP-SGHMC 0.43 10−6 92.84%
models, there are no theoretical guarantee on performance.
In Abadi et al. [2016] another differentially private SGD
was proposed, requiring a smaller variance for added Gaus-
sian noise, yet it still did not provide theoretical guarantees
on utility. On the other hand, the standard SG-MCMC has
been shown to be able to converge to the target posterior
distribution in theory. In this paper, we discuss the effect
of our modification for differential privacy on the perfor-
mance of the SG-MCMC, which endows theoretical guar-
antees on the bounds for the mean squared error of the pos-
terior mean.
Bayesian modeling provides an effective framework for
privacy-preserving data analysis, as posterior sampling nat-
urally introduces noise into the system, leading to differen-
tial privacy [Dimitrakakis et al., 2014, Wang et al., 2015].
In Foulds et al. [2016], the privacy for sampling from ex-
ponential families with a Gibbs sampler was studied. In
Wang et al. [2015] a comprehensive analysis was proposed
on the differential privacy of SG-MCMC methods. As
a comparison, we have derived a tighter bound for the
amount of noise required to guarantee a certain differen-
tial privacy, yielding a more practical upper bound for the
step size.
6 Conclusion
Previous work on differential privacy has modified existing
algorithms, or has built complicated frameworks that sacri-
fice a certain amount of performance for privacy. In some
cases the privacy loss may be relatively large. This paper
has addressed a privacy analysis for SG-MCMC, a stan-
dard class of methods for scalable posterior sampling for
Bayesian models. We have significantly relaxed the con-
dition for SG-MCMC methods being differentially private,
compared to previous works. Our results indicate that stan-
dard SG-MCMC methods have strong privacy guarantees
for problems in large scale. In addition, we have proposed
theoretical analysis on the estimation performance of dif-
ferentially private SG-MCMC methods. Our results show
that even when there is a strong privacy constraint, the
differentially private SG-MCMC still endows a guarantee
on the model performance. Our experiments have shown
that with our analysis, the standard SG-MCMC methods
achieve both state-of-the-art utility and strong privacy com-
pared with related methods on multiple tasks, such as logis-
tic regression and deep neural networks.
Our results also shed lights onto how SG-MCMC methods
help improving the generalization for training models, as it
is well acknowledged that there is a connection between
differential privacy and generalization for a model (cite
Learning with Differential Privacy: Stability, Learnabil-
ity and the Sufficiency and Necessity of ERM Principle).
For example, in Saatchi and Wilson [2017], a Bayesian
GAN model trained with SGHMC is proposed and shows
promising performance in avoiding mode collapse prob-
lem in GAN training. According to Arora et al. [2017], the
mode collapse problem is potentially caused by weak gen-
eralization. Therefore, it is very likely that Bayesian GAN
moderated mode collapse problem because SGHMC natu-
rally leads to better generalization.
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A Proof of Theorem 3
We first prove Algorithm 1 is (ǫ, δ)-DP if we change the
variance of zt to be σ
2
t =
c2
2
L2T 2/3t1/3 log(1/δ)
ǫ2N2 η
2
t I for some
constant c2.
It is easy to see that SGLD in Algorithm 1 consists of a se-
quence of updates for the model parameter θ. Each update
corresponds to a random mechanism Mi defined in The-
orem 1, thus we will first derive the moments accountant
for each iteration. In each iteration, the only data access
is
∑
i∈Jt
g˜t(di) in Step 6. Therefore, in the following, we
only focus on the interaction between
∑
i∈Jt
g˜t(di) and the
noise zt, which is essentially
† ηt
τ
∑
i∈Jt
g¯t(di) + zt.
To simplify the notation, we let η˜2 =
σ2t τ
2
L2η2t t
1/3 ,
and the variance of zt can be rewritten as σ
2
t =
(η˜2L2η2t t
1/3/τ2)I‡. Then we have:
ηt
τ
∑
i∈Jt
g¯t(di) + zt =
ηt
τ
(∑
i∈Jt
g¯t(di) +N(0, (σ
2
t τ
2/η2t )I)
)
=
ηtL
τ
(
1
L
∑
i∈Jt
g¯t(di) +N(0, η˜
2t1/3I)
)
If we let f(di) =
1
L gˆt(di) and σ
2 = η˜2t1/3, we can apply
Lemma 2 to calculate the upper bound for the log moment
of the privacy loss random variable for the tth iteration to
be
α(λ) ≤ t−1/3q2λ2/η˜2
as long as the conditions in Lemma 2 are satisfied, that is
η˜2t1/3 ≥ 1 and the mini-batch sampling probability q <
1
16η˜t1/6
.
Using the composability property of the moments accoun-
tant in Theorem 1, over T iterations, the log moment of the
privacy loss random variable is bounded by
α(λ) ≤
T∑
t=1
(t−1/3)q2λ2/η˜2 .
According to the tail bound property in Theorem 1, δ is the
minimum of exp (αM(λ)− λǫ) w.r.t.λ. However, since λ
is an integer, a closed form for this minimum is generally
intractable. Nevertheless, to guarantee (ǫ, δ)-DP, it suffices
that
T∑
t=1
(t−1/3)q2λ2/η˜2 ≤ λǫ/2, exp(−λǫ/2) ≤ δ , (2)
†In this paper, we only consider the case for which we choose
priors that do not depend on the data, as is common in the
Bayesian setting.
‡Later we will show the optimal decreasing ratio for the step
size is t1/3.
We also require that our choice of parameters satisfies
Lemma 2. Consequently, we have
λ ≤ η˜2t1/3 log(1/qη˜2t1/3) ≤ η˜2 log(1/qη˜2) (3)
Since
∑T
t=1 t
−1/3 = O(T 2/3), we can use a similar
technique§ as in Abadi et al. [2016] to find explicit con-
stants c1 and c2 such that when ǫ = c1q
2T 2/3 and η˜ =
c2
q
√
T 2/3 log(1/δ)
ǫ , the conditions (2) (3) are satisfied. If we
plug in η˜ and q, we have proved that Algorithm 1 is (ǫ, δ)-
DP when zi ∼ N(0, c
2
2
L2T 2/3t1/3 log(1/δ)
ǫ2N2 η
2
t I).
For the second step of the proof, we prove that Algorithm 1
is (ǫ, δ)-DP when the original variance of zt is used, i.e.,
σt =
ηt
N . This is straightforward because when ηt <
ǫ2Nt−1/3
c2
2
L2T 2/3 log(1/δ)
we have
c2
2
L2T 2/3t1/3 log(1/δ)
ǫ2N2 η
2
t < ηt/N
as long as the step size ηt is positive. Adding more noise
decreases the privacy loss. To satisfy (ǫ, δ)-DP, it suffices
to set the variance of zi as ηt/N , which gives the origi-
nal Algorithm 1, a variant of the standard SGLD algorithm
with decreasing step size.
In addition, Lemma 2 requires η˜2t1/3 ≥ 1 and q < 1
16η˜t1/6
.
Note ηt =
N
t1/3η˜2L2
, we also need to ensure ηt ≤ NL2 and
ηt >
q2N
256L2 .
B Assumptions on SG-MCMC Algorithms
For the diffusion in (1), we first define the generator L as:
Lψ , 1
2
∇ψ · F + 1
2
g(θ)g(θ)∗ : D2ψ , (4)
where ψ is a measurable function, Dkψ means the k-
derivative of ψ, ∗ means transpose. a ·b , aT b for two
vectors a and b, A : B , trace(AT B) for two matrices
A and B. Under certain assumptions, there exists a func-
tion, φ, such that the following Poisson equation is satisfied
Mattingly et al. [2010]:
Lψ = φ− φ¯ , (5)
where φ¯ ,
∫
φ(θ)ρ(dθ) denotes the model average, with
ρ being the equilibrium distribution for the diffusion (1),
which is assumed to coincide with the posterior distribu-
tion p(θ|D). The following assumptions are made for the
SG-MCMC algorithms [Vollmer et al., 2016, Chen et al.,
2015].
Assumption 1 The diffusion (1) is ergodic. Furthermore,
the solution of (5) exists, and the solution functional ψ sat-
isfies the following properties:
• ψ and its up to 3th-order derivatives Dkψ, are
bounded by a function V , i.e., ‖Dkψ‖ ≤ CkVpk for
k = (0, 1, 2, 3), Ck, pk > 0.
§Further explained in Section C of the SM.
• The expectation of V on {xl} is bounded:
supl EVp(xl) <∞.
• V is smooth such that
sups∈(0,1) Vp (sx+(1− s)y) ≤
C (Vp (x) + Vp (y)), ∀x ∈ Rm,y ∈ Rm, p ≤
max{2pk} for some C > 0.
C Calculating Constants in Moment
Accountant Methods
For calculating the constants c1 and c2, which is a
part of the moment accoutant method, we refer to
https://github.com/tensorflow/models ¶ as
an implimentation of the moment accountant method. A
comprehensive description for the implimentation can be
found int Abadi et al. [2016].
This code allows one to calculate the corresponding ǫ(δ)
given δ(ǫ), q, T, η0 by enumerating all the possible integers
under a certain threhosld as the candidate value of λ and
selecting the one that minimizes ǫ(δ). Once ǫ(δ) is deter-
mined, it is easy to calculate c1 and c2 for evaluating the
upper bound for the step size.
D Proof of Theorem 4
Claim: Under the same setting as Theorem 3, but using
a fixed-step size ηt = η, Algorithm 1 satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP
whenever η < ǫ
2N
c2L2Tlog(1/δ) for another constant c.
Proof The only change of the proof for fixed step size is
that the expression for the variance of the Gaussian noise zt
becomes σ2t = η
2
0L
2η2t /τ
2 for fixed step size. We still ap-
ply Theorem 1 and Lemma 2 to find the required conditions
for (ǫ, δ)-DP:
Tq2λ2/η20 ≤ λǫ/2
exp(−λǫ/2) ≤ δ, λ ≤ η20 log(1/qη0)
Using the method described in the previous section,
one can find c3 and c4 such that when ǫ = c3q
2T and
η0 = c4
q
√
log(1/δ)
ǫ satisfy the above conditions. Then if
we plug in η0 and q, and compare it to η/N , it is easy to see
Algorithm 1 satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP when η < ǫ
2N
c2
4
L2T log(1/δ)
.
E Proof of Proposition 5
Claim: Under Assumption 1 in the section B, the MSE
of SGLD with a decreasing step size sequence {ηt <
¶This is under the Apache License, Version 2.0
ǫ2Nt−1/3
c2
2
L2T 2/3 log(1/δ)
} as in Theorem 3 is bounded, for a con-
stant C independent of {η, T, τ} and a constant ΓM de-
pending on T and U(·), as E
(
φˆL − φ¯
)2
≤ C
(
2
3
(
N
n
− 1
)
N2ΓMT
−1 +
1
3η˜0
+ 2η˜20T
−2/3
)
.
where η˜0 ,
ǫ2
c2
2
L2 log(1/δ)
.
Proof
First, we adopt the MSE formula for the decreasing-step-
size SG-MCMC with Euler integrator (1-st order integra-
tor) from Theorem 5 of Chen et al. [2015], which is written
as
E
(
φˆL − φ¯
)2
≤ C
(
T∑
t=1
η2t
S2T
E ‖∆Vt‖2 + 1
ST
+
(
∑T
t=1 η
2
t )
2
S2T
)
,
(6)
where ST ,
∑T
t=1 ηt, and ∆Vt is a term related to g˜t,
which, according to Theorem 3 of Chen et al. [2017], can
be simplified as
E |∆Vl|2
=
(N − τ)N2
τ

 1
N2
∑
i,j
Eαliαlj − 2
N(N − 1)
∑
i≤j
Eαliαlj


,
(N − τ)N2
τ
Γt . (7)
Let ΓM , maxt Γt. Substituting (7) into (6), we have
E
(
φˆL − φ¯
)2
≤ (8)
C


∑T
t η
2
t(∑T
t ηt
)2
(
N
τ
− 1
)
N2ΓM +
1∑T
t ηt
+
(∑T
t η
2
t
)2
(∑T
t ηt
)


Now, if we assume η˜0 =
ǫ
c2
2
L2 log(1/δ)
, then we rewrite ηt =
η0t
−1/3T−2/3.
Note
∑T
t t
p ≈ 1p+1T p+1. Plug this into the bound in (8),
we have:
E
(
φˆL − φ¯
)2
≤
C


∑T
t η
2
t(∑T
t η
)2
(
N
τ
− 1
)
N2ΓM +
1∑T
t ηt
+
(∑T
t η
2
t
)2
(∑T
t ηt
)2


≤C
(
2
3
(
N
τ
− 1
)
N2ΓMT
−1 +
1
3η˜0
+ 2η˜20T
−2/3
)
